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Integration with the global economy is essential in making the transition from plan to market. Price distortions, so common under central planning, were maintained only through a formidable array of trade and foreign exchange controls that divorced the domestic from the international market. Dismantling these controls reduces the distortions and promotes more efficient resource allocation-a potentially dramatic process, especially for the smaller economies among the new independent states. Moving toward international prices poses a competitive challenge to domestic producers and signals the direction for needed reforms. Trade policy provides the link between domestic and international prices-and markets-and is thus a key determinant of the pace and scope of structural change during the transition. Trade policies complement other necessary reforms during transition, such as macroeconomic stabilization, privatization, and domestic market reform.
Trade reform is potentially much more wrenching in the new independent states, since the centralized state planning system left a legacy of excessive economic interdependence among the states. This report, which summarizes trade performance and the experience with trade policy reform in the new independent states that emerged from the former Soviet Llnion, brings together the experiences of a large number of these countries in a comparative analysis. It finds that the slow adjustment strategy in trade reform has typically backfired in its effort to reduce adjustment costs. The slow reformers-such as Ukraine and Uzbekistan-did not arrest their output decline, and most of their adjustment costs are still to come. The Baltics, the fastest reformers, have done the most to reorient their production and trade, and their nearterm growth forecasts are relatively optimistic. The report also recommends strategies for better integration into the international economy. Such strategies entail actions by these countries and by their main trading partners-the industrial countries of the OECD.
The report is based on eight country studies and other analyses by World Bank staff and consultants. The findings and recommendations of these studies have been communicated to the governments concerned (in most cases they were formulated interactively) in policy dialogue with the Bank on international trade reform, supported in many cases by World Bank lending. The work here follows a long-established tradition of World Bank analysis and advice on trade policy reform both to individual member countries and on systemic issues. It is hoped that dissemination of this work will increase understanding of these issues among a wider audience of policymakers concerned with the challenges faced by countries in transition and among trade experts unfamiliar with the specific problems of these countries. Ineffective trade and payments policies have been at the root of the decline in trade, which has been linked to the contraction in output. Their heavy economic interdependence, its roots in the centralized state planning system of the FSU, has intensified the problem.
Michael
Countries that have reformed slowly have often maintained that their strategy will reduce the high cost of transition. In the NIS, however, the slow adjustment strategy has typically backfired. The slow reformers-such as Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Belarus, and Georgia-have not arrested their output decline and still face most of their adjustment costs (Le Gall 1994; Kaufmann 1994; Connolly and Vatnick 1994) .2 The Baltics, the fastest reformers, have done the most to reorient production and trade. And their near-term growth forecasts are relatively optimistic. In Estonia, where effective trade policies were introduced as part of an overall package of rapid stabilization and economic liberalization, output began to expand in 1993. In Latvia and Lithuania the decline appears to have bottomed out, and output began to expand a bit by late 1994 (Hansen and Sorsa 1994; Sorsa 1994a Sorsa , 1994b . The Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, and Russia, falling between the two extremes, have introduced trade and other reforms but have not yet arrested declines in output and trade (Konovalov 1994; Walters 1994; Krumm 1994) . The results of the case studies are reflected in cross-country regression analysis, which shows that trade reform and reorientation of trade toward the rest of the world have done much to arrest the decline in output usually associated with the transformation from planning to market. Trade policy reform has usually been a part of broader reforms aimed at liberalization, stabilization, and systemic change.
Some of the study's other principal findings:
. Export restraints-big. Intervention in the trade regimes was mainly by export rather than import restraints-including quotas, taxes, and foreign exchange surrender at below-market rates. These widely used restraints imposed high costs in many of the NIS. * Import protection-implicit. Although explicit import protection was low, import competition was very weak due to exchange rates that were undervalued (due to export restraints and capital flight); and industries were further protected through export restraints that provided cheap raw materials. * OECD market access-a growing problem. Although market access constraints in the OECD countries did not significantly affect these countries' trade performance in the recent past, these constraints are likely to create significant difficulties for the future expansion of NIS exports once supply problems are overcome. In particular, antidumping actions and the continued classification of these countries as non-market economies are becoming problems (Kaminski 1994) . * Payments difficulties-at the core. Payments difficulties were a root cause of problems in trade among the countries (interstate trade). Initially, the free-rider problems of the ruble zone discouraged trade. More recently, inadequate correspondent accounts among commercial banks and lack of free access to convertible currencies have inhibited interstate trade. * The terms of trade shock-for some, enormous. For the energy importers it was larger than the oil shock of 1973 was for the OECD countries. Some countries accumulated significant arrears in interstate trade, inducing their partners to cut trade further. * State trading-a drag. Many countries developed large intergovernmental barter arrangements in interstate trade and attempted through them to provide subsidized energy and raw material inputs. But the price controls implicit in these agreements undermined their effectiveness, and they did not revive trade. More important, state trading prevents the spread of the market economy. * Political economy-nomenclatura still extracting rents. The slow adjustment strategy is often motivated by the nomenclatura's desire to extract rents. Where most central planning controls are vanishing, export restraints are one of the best remaining opportunities to extract such rents.
There are significant differences in trade performance across countries. (See table 1 for a summary description of the trade regimes as of mid-1994 of the eight countries examined in Michalopoulos and Tarr 1994.) By 1994 some countries that reformed the fastest-such as Estonia-had much larger exports to the rest of the world than in 1991 (table 2). But for the 15 countries together, total exports to the rest of the world in 1994 amounted only to 85 percent of the 1991 level. And total trade among the 15 countries was only 35 percent of that in 1991, measured in U.S. dollars at implicit exchange rates.
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The magnitude and significance of the trade decline 'Fhe overall quality of the trade data is weak. In particular, the data exaggerate the trade collapse between 1990 and 1992 because the dollar value of international trade for these countries in 1990 was artificially inflated on account of the very large overvaluation of the ruble exchange rate with the dollar at that time. The decline after 1992, especially for interstate trade, however, was significant and real, a conclusion corroborated by firm-level surveys (Bull 1994) .
The impact of the decline in interstate trade on output was especially severe because of the highly interlinked production structure of the former Soviet Union. Failure to supply needed inputs in interstate trade reduced output in downstream industries. And this output decline further reduced trade due to the reduction in the production of exportables.
Under central planning, the republics of the Soviet lUnion traded excessively with each other (see table 3 for a comparison with the EC and Eastern European countries). Part of this trade was the result of decisions to locate production on the basis of political or other considerations unrelated to economic efficiency. Some other part of trade involved simply inefficient production that could not be expected to meet international competition once a market system was adopted. Gravity models suggest that in the long run, following market reforms and depending on the country, the share of total trade accounted for by FSU interregional trade would decline to about 15 to 40 percent of the total, depending on the country (Kaminski and others 1996) . In practice, the share seems to have fallen more or less about what would have been predicted, although the overall level is probably less than would have been expected. True, the precipitous drop in trade in the short run undoubtedly hit output, but some of this simply reduced waste and improved the allocation of resources.
Trade with the rest of the world declined much less, and in some countries not at all since 1992-in part because most countries consciously shifted exports to the OECD to earn hard currency. This shift was usually within an overall trade regime that restrained exports with very significant adverse effects on output and welfare. The terms of trade shock
The decline in trade and output was compounded by a very adverse terms of trade shock for the energy and raw material importing states (see table  4 ). During 1992-94 the major energy exporters, Russia and Turkmenistan, raised previously heavily subsidized prices for interstate shipments of oil and natural gas to close to world levels. The worst losers were the Baltics, Belarus, and Moldova, with estimated terms of trade losses of between 20 and 40 percent. 4 This is a terms of trade shock substantially larger than that experienced by oil-importing countries after the oil shock of 1973. 
Trade with the rest of the world: the bias against exports
Once the USSR broke up, the centralized allocation of resources by Gosplan and Gosnab ended, but new market-based mechanisms for allocating resources were slow to emerge in most countries. The institutional infrastructure for the conduct of international trade was-and remains-deficient (Nash 1994). Exports of some countries also suffered due to declining supplies, as with oil in Russia-declines deepened by trade and payments policies following independence.
The most striking features of trade policy in almost all 15 countries were the presence of extensive export controls to "keep goods at home," the absence of explicit import restraints to protect domestic producers, and the extensive use of state trading. Export restraints focused on the key energy, raw material, and food exports. Restraints included export licenses and quotas, export taxes, limited licensing of authorized exporters, monopsony purchases on the domestic market of exportables by state trading organizations, control by state trading organizations of extemal trade of key commodities, and surrender of foreign exchange at belowmarket exchange rates. The motive was to keep domestic prices low to ease adjustment for domestic enterprises using these products as inputs and to soften the impact of price liberalization of food products on consumers. It is no surprise, then, that the pace of trade reform was closely related to the pace of price liberalization and the broader market reform.
At one extreme were the Baltics, notably Estonia, which reformed earlier and faster and which substantially reduced export restraints and the role of state trading organizations in international trade. By mid-1994 very few of their exports to the rest of the world were restrained or flowing through state trading organizations. As early as the end of 1992 these countries had introduced new currencies, begun to stabilize their economies, and, in the case of Estonia, established a liberal regime for exports and imports. Special interests were beginning to call for protection in 1994, as the new currencies strengthened-pressures for the most part resisted.
At the other extreme, in countries like Belarus, Georgia, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, and llzbekistan, export restraints were com-'I'RADE WITH TI I E RESTOFTHE WORLD:TIHE BIAS AGAINST EXPORTS I I mon, and state organizations continued to control the bulk of foreign trade, especially key exports. As of mid-1994 these countries had not yet undertaken significant stabilization and market reform efforts. In between were countries like the Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, and Russia, which have made progress in stabilization and market reforms but have retained a significant but declining role for the state in the control of key commodity exports to the rest of the world, while liberalizing other trade policies.
Import policy: the myth of low protection One of the main concerns about the policies for transition in Eastern Europe has been this: stabilization policies using a fixed exchange rate as a nominal anchor combined with rapid trade liberalization could result in overvaluation of the exchange rate and create undue competitive pressure on domestic enterprises from imports. That would impose adjustment costs on1 the economies before thev could adapt to the new price signals.
This has not been a problem in the NIS, despite the fact that most new cotintries imposed few formal import restraints before 1994. The problem so far has been too little competition from imports rather than too much. The reason: undervalued exchange rates made the cost of importing very high-evidenced by real wages of only $10 to $30 a month in 1992, and only slightly higher in many countries in 1994 (Michalopoulos and Tarr 1994a) .
The exchange rate has tended to be undervalued rather thani overvalued for two reasons. First, the financial demand for foreign exchange was very strong in almost all countries. Given macroeconomic regimes with large fiscal deficits, high rates of domestic inflation, and negative real interest rates, residents sought a store of value other than domestic currencies. Since domestic assets were not an effective store of value (due to lack of privatization), residents chose to buy foreign exchange and there was significant capital flight. Second, by restraining exports to the convertible currency area, countries tended to forgo convertible currency earnings which, if available, would have caused the market price of foreign exchange to fall (the real exchange rate to appreciate) and made imports less expensive.
Several countries-notably Russia through 1993 and LUzbekistan still-have employed extensive import subsidv programs.
5 And Ulkraine, among others, has allocated foreign exchange at below-market rates to preferred importers. The impact of both the import subsidy program and the allocation of foreign exchange to noncompetitive imports was to reduce the amount of foreign exchange available for those wanting to import competitive imports. This further increased the price of foreign exchange in market-determined environments or simply reduced the quantity for imports in rationed environments.
There is thus an equivalency between export and import restraints: the tradables sector is taxed. Integration into the world trading environment for many of the new independent states has been retarded by their trade restraints, which reduced both exports and imports. And most countries using export controls further retarded adjustment by providing additional support to enterprises in explicit subsidies and directed bank credits at highly negative real interest rates.
The costs of this approach are very high. According to a preliminary estimate, the cost of Russian export restraints in 1993 amounited to about 20 percent of GDP (Gros 1994a ), a picture that started to change in late 1993. More foreign exchange was becoming available through foreign exchange markets in Russia and elsewhere, as markets strengthened and new currencies appeared. The appreciation of currencies prodded more domestic enterprises to seek protection from international competition. Several countries, including Latvia, Lithuania, and Russia, responded to such pressures with higher tariffs in 1994-95.
The need for improved access to OECD markets Although the supply-side problems bear most of the responsibility for the trade decline in the past few years, most countries face potentially significant trade barriers, especially in nontariff and contingent restraints in C)ECD markets. Energy and raw materials, significant portions of total exports, encounter few problems of market access. And in 1992 and 1993 most OECD countries granted most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment to the NIS, with many also granted eligibility for the Generalized System of Preferences in a number of OECD markets. In addition, the Baltics have concluded association agreements with the European LInion as well as a series of agreements with countries of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) providing for free trade treatment for Baltic products, except agriculture.
Nontariff barriers can, however, be important impediments to future trade-especially in agriculture, food products, leather, textiles, chemicals, and metals. Antidumping actions have been a particular problem for several countries. The new independent states "inherited" antidumping actions started against the Soviet LUnion and were subject to many new ones in 1992 and 1993. Belarus, Georgia, Kazakstan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Ukraine have all been the object of some sort of antidumping action on products from aluminum to ferro-silicon and uranium.
The new countries, like the Soviet Union before them, are not yet members of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). They continue to be treated as "non-market economies" and are subject to individual rules often decided arbitrarily by each importing country. These factors-plus the remaining trade barriers and preferences extended to other countries-mean that the new independent states face per-haps the world's most severe obstacles to market access for their exports-other than for raw materials and energy. As they address their supply-side problems, they may find that problems of market access seriously constrain their future export expansion in agriculture and manufactures.
Interstate trade
At independence, production was highly concentrated, with some goods produced by a single or very few producers, and so trade among the countries absorbed an unusually high proportion of total trade-an uncommon pattern by the standards of market economies. At 61 percent of total trade, Russia had the lowest dependence on trade with the other republics in 1990; for the others, such trade amounted to between 82 and 93 percent of the total. This was the result of links forged by central planninig that often had little to do with comparative or locational advantage. Market reforms shoLild have reduced some of this trade-but the main cause of the very large decline in interstate trade is the continuation of ineffective trade and payments regimes.
Payments problems
Payments problems-with economic agents either unwilling or unable to use the banking system to pay for goods and services from other countries-have been the most serious impediment to interstate trade, especially in 1992-93 under the common ruble zone. Russia alone could create cash rubles, but the central banks of all 15 states could expand the money supply by creating credit in rubles. Without monetary coordination, governments saw no value in exporting in the ruble zone. All they gained for the exports were ruble credits in their banking system, which their central banks could create independently-and already had created too many in any case. Governments, even in the Baltics, quickly responded by imposing interstate export licensing requirements typically more severe than for their trade outside the FSLI (Michalopoulos and Tarr 1994a) .
The payments situation quickly deteriorated further. After July 1992 Russia began to accumulate large surpluses on its bilateral trade balances with most of the new independent states. To avoid unlimited financing of these trade surpluses and stem the outflow of goods, Russia imposed credit limits on the central bank correspondent accounts previously established for these countries. But the system was still plagued by huge uncertainties and long delays (about three months) in a highly inflationary environment. When a country exceeded its limit, the Russian central bank could refuse to clear the payments orders of enterprises in the debtor country. That meant that Russian exporters would not be paid for the goods they shipped, even if the importer had funds in its commercial bank to cover the payments order.
By late 1993 all countries except Tajikistan had their own currencies, eliminating the free-rider problem. Countries no longer had to fear that direct trade between enterprises facilitated through the commercial banking system would give them trade surpluses of no value. The Russian central bank's requirement for clearing through the central bank correspondent accounts was dropped. A growing network of correspondent accounts among commercial banks spread through some countries (Russia and Ukraine), providing reasonably fast tumaround on payments.
While this network was facilitating some trade in 1993-94, a host of new issues emerged: First, the new currencies, with few exceptions (that of the Baltics), were not convertible and could not be used in trade. Denominating trade in rubles was a problem, however, because of the ruble's instability. And the use of correspondent accounts was further constrained by the general weaknesses of the commercial banking system. Second, many countries, facing a serious foreign exchange shortage, were unwilling to use foreign exchange for the denomination or settlement of interstate trade transactions. So barter continued to be the favored instrument of trade among most of the new states.
Price adjustment and the terms of trade
In all the new states, price controls or export restraints initially kept domestic prices of many products below world prices. Since price controls were not the same in all countries, restraints were placed on exports to prevent price-controlled commodities from being exported to markets with higher prices, including other ruble-zone countries.
But most prices in international and interstate trade were liberalized. So there were significant adjustments in the terms of trade, especially between exporters and importers of energy and raw materials. Energy importers tried to mitigate their terms of trade losses through special bilateral agreements with exporting countries to supply oil and other raw materials at less than world prices (see below). Some countries (Belarus) managed to work out such arrangements during a transition period, but others (the Baltics) could not.
Many countries have not made the necessary domestic adjustment to these price changes. Even with substantial progress (as in Moldova), high energy import prices mean that countries must either sell larger quantities of their exports or find other means of financing imports. Neither is easy. Incomes are still falling, and it is difficult to obtain enough external financing for energy imports. That is why some countries (Georgia, Ukraine) have run up arrears in interstate trade, inducing their trading partners to reduce the volume of trade even further.
State trading
Countries reacted to these interstate trade problems in two ways. Estonia and the other Baltics moved quickly to abandon most of the machinery of the planned economy. The others reestablished what they knew best: a network of massive intergovernmental barter agreements analogous to the system of state trading under the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA), with goods to be distributed through state ministries or agencies that were the successors to Gosnab. The agreements were frequently implemented through national systems of state orders and controls on interstate trade shipments.
Networks of these agreements were concluded in 1992, 1993, and 1994. The later agreements contained fewer items on the lists supplied under state obligation, and prices appeared to be closer to world market prices. Moreover, domestic procurement has been liberalized over time in some countries. The Kyrgyz Republic, Moldova, and Russia have moved away from state orders to competitive procurement by state agencies in the domestic market.
The bilateral trade agreements failed to maintain the level of interstate trade, with deliveries frequently less than half the contracted amount. The price controls that motivated the bilateral agreements also undermined them-those on exports reduced incentives to export. Moreover, analogous to the CMEA problems, there was no agreement on how to settle imbalances in the agreed trade. The distortionary impact of the obligatory trade remained pervasive, even though Russia, which has by far the largest trade, had by 1993 narrowed the list of goods traded under state obligation to a few commodities (except in agreements with Ukraine). Countries such as Uzbekistan tax their agricultural sector on their exports to Russia (offering low prices to their domestic producers) to subsidize their energy-using sectors. Through 1995 Russia used export restraints to keep the domestic energy prices low. Roskontract (the successor to Gosnab in Russia) purchased energy cheaply on the Russian domestic market to meet its obligations under the interstate agreements. It then sold the underpriced imported inputs, such as cotton from central Asian states, at below world market prices in Russia. Such arrangements greatly extended the range of products that enterprises received at less than world prices.
But the principal shortcoming of the state trading agreements is that they perpetuate managed trade and retard market forces. As long as trade is under bilateral pacts, governments-not markets-determine the allocation of resources and the volume and terms of trade.
Three countries-three experiences
Interesting in their own right, Estonia, Russia, and Ukraine are also typical of patterns of overall economic transformation that characterize all 15 countries.
Estonia: policies spell success
At independence in late 1991, Estonia faced severe problems. 6 With 15 more or less independent central banks creating rubles at a rapid rate, Estonia faced an annual rate of inflation in excess of 1,000 percent for the year to June 1992. Over 90 percent of its trade was with the countries of the FSU-and it exported processed food, textiles, machinery and engineering products, and imported energy and raw materials. Since the relative prices of energy and raw materials were grossly undervalued in the internal trade of the FSU, Estonia faced a massive terms of trade shock: over 15 percent of its GDP. Moreover, Estonia's trade relations with Russia-its major partner in the FSU-quickly deteriorated. This made importing energy products difficult and expensive, and its exports were subject to twice the MFN tariff rates in Russia.
Estonia responded to this crisis with a strong, perhaps radical, freemarket and macroeconomic stabilization program that was highly effective. In June 1992 it was the first to create an independent currency, the kroon. It also established a currency board and made the kroon convertible at a relatively undervalued rate of exchange to encourage exports. Limiting the expansion of the money supply and controlling inflation were a primary objective. The currency board supplied kroons only in proportion to the net inflow of foreign currency.
It worked. Inflation dropped to 85 percent in the year following introduction of the kroon and has fallen steadily since. Prices of most goods were removed from administrative control by the end of 1992-and by 1994 controls remained only for some government monopolies, like electricity.
Early on, Estonia put a highly liberal trade regime in place. Health and safety provisions aside, Estonia has no quantitative import restraints, and import tariffs were only 0.5 percent for all products except a few luxury goods. Export restraints were removed for most products in 1992 and most remaining products in 1994. In 1993 Estonia negotiated reciprocal free trade agreements on manufactured products with Finland, Sweden, Norway, and Switzerland-and obtained GSP status on its exports to many markets, including the European Union. Meanwhile, trade with its former major trading partners in the FSU-such as Ukraine, Belarus, and especially Russia-experienced major difficulties due to payments and other problems.
These policies have done much to reorient trade, control inflation, and restore economic growth. In 1993 Estonia had per capita exports to non-FSU countries of US$288, compared with an average of $197 for the rest of the NIS. Exports to the FSU were reduced to 43 percent of total exports in 1993, and in 1994 Finland replaced Russia as Estonia's most import trading partner. Key Estonian exports to the West include wood, food, and textile products. Estonia also earns foreign exchange on trade in services-notably shipping, transit trade, and tourism. The open regime encouraged subcontracting, which has allowed Estonia to take advantage of its highly skilled but low-cost workforce.
True, Estonia enjoys a geographical advantage that allows it to trade easily through the Baltic Sea. But it is very unlikely that location alone would have produced these results in the absence of a suitable policy framework.
Estonia's stable macroeconomic regime and convertible currency have also been instrumental in its spectacular success in attracting foreign investment; FDI was almost 10 percent of GDP in both 1993 and 1994. Transparent, market-based signals to producers provided easy access to foreign inputs at world market prices and allowed the market to pick the winners. Convertibility and banking problems in the other FSll countries meant that a big share of this trade remained in barter.
In 1994 Estonia became the first NIS to arrest the output decline traditionally associated with the first years of transition. Having begun in the second quarter of 1993, its output expansion of 5 percent in 1994 was the largest among the NIS.
Why could Estonia adopt such a strong free trade, price liberalization, and fiscally conservative policy stance? All three Baltic states have shown a strong commitment to fiscal balance, the political economy of which remains to be explained. The choice of a currency board appears to depend on the individuals in charge of monetary policy in Estonia at the time. But the Latvian macrostabilization has been comparably effective in controlling inflation without a currency board. On trade and price reform, the primary explanation for the Baltic states, and especially Estonia, appears to be an overriding concern to escape the Soviet past and return to Europe. That strengthened public support for any endeavor that promised to lead to integration with western and northern Europe. Free trade, currency convertibility, the free trade agreements with the EFTA countries, and the association agreements with the European Union were all seen as important parts of that process.
Russia: moderate reforms
Russia's foreign trade regime has been progressively liberalized, and few vestiges of central planning remain.
7 Quantitative restrictions, licensing, and other nontariff barriers have been for the most part eliminated on both exports and imports. The proportion of trade flowing through the state foreign trade organizations has declined to less than 15 percent, as has that accounted for by govemment-to-govemment agreements with other FSU countries. But export taxes on oil were still in place at the end of 1995, and an export registration system is being implemented-possibly a problem.
Since Russia's independence, both macroeconomic stabilization and trade reform have undergone a rocky path. Throughout 1992-94 repeated efforts to stabilize the economy were undermined by cheap credits offered by the central bank and an inability to contain fiscal deficits. This led to high and variable rates of inflation-reaching 30 percent monthly and threatening hyperinflation. In 1995 progressive implementation of more restrictive monetary and fiscal policies brought the monthly rate of inflation down to less than 5 percent. The substantial output declines seem to have bottomed out at the end of 1995.
As in many FSU countries, post-independence protection restrained exports of energy and raw materials-the bulk of exports-and encouraged imports, especially foodstuffs. In 1992 export licenses, export quotas, export taxes, and surrenders of foreign exchange at below-market exchange rates were the main restraints, and import subsidies were used through 1993.
The stated objectives of both the export restraints and the import subsidies were the same: to keep prices of inputs to domestic industry and consumers artificially low to ease the adjustment. But discretionary provision of export licenses and import subsidies (along with directed credits from the central bank) created enormous opportunities for rents. One estimate puts the costs of export restraints on oil and import subsidies at more than 25 percent of Russian GDP in 1992 (Gros 1994) .
Foreign exchange surrenders at below-market rates were quickly dropped, and the system progressively liberalized. By 1994 nontariff export controls had been lifted and export taxes eliminated on most products, except oil. Import subsidies were terminated after 1993. With the elimination of most export restraints, and with positive real interest rates dramatically reducing capital outflows, the real exchange rate has appreciated substantially. Real import competition and protectionist pressures emerged in Russia in 1994 and strengthened in 1995.
The govemment has fended off the most serious protectionist pressures. A new import tariff schedule puts the range of duties at 5 to 30 percent, and the government is committed to an announced schedule of import duty reductions over the next three to five years. The harmonization of excise duty rates between imports and domestically produced goods is also under way. How the government will withstand demands for protection that are intensifying as industry restructures is unclear. The challenge will be to follow through with its commitment to eliminate export taxes, avoid restrictive export registration schemes, and implement the tariff reductions as announced.
With its exports of energy and raw materials, Russia experienced a large favorable terms of trade change in its trade with the NIS. This led to the accumulation of surpluses in its trade with most of the NIS-trade dominated, however, by state trading relationships. While the share of trade with the NIS conducted through centralized trade arrangements has been substantially reduced, the challenge now is to convert this trade completely to a market basis.
The progress in liberalizing the trade regime has helped support a recovery in trade. Total exports in 1995 are estimated at $78 billion, compared with $54 billion in 1992, and imports are estimated to have risen from $43 billion in 1992 to $65 billion in 1995. The commodity composition has not changed drastically, as energy products and raw materials continue to be the main exportables; but a rising share is going to OECD markets (see Michalopoulos and Tarr 1994a , table 1.5).
Ukraine: ineffective trade policies
When Ukraine obtained its independence in September 1991, inflation was rampant.
8 It was dependent on FSU countries for over 80 percent of its trade, and its high energy dependence on Russia and Turkmenistan hit its terms of trade. The collapse of the planning mechanism for trade among the FSU countries, without an effective payments mechanism in place, meant a sharp contraction in this trade.
Until the fall of 1994, Ukraine responded by implementing many of the planning and regulatory features of the FSU. Large loss-making state enterprises periodically received state subsidies or had their debts monetized by the independent Ukrainian central bank, creating massive credit. A state order system established output targets for enterprises to deliver to the state. Prices of most of the important commodities remained controlled-creating an incentive to export rather than sell on domestic markets, held in check by an elaborate network of export restraints. The restraints varied over time but included export licenses, export quotas, export taxes, surrenders of foreign exchange at below-market exchange rates, and a limited list of authorized export agents. Ukraine signed bilateral trade agreements with the 14 other countries of the FSU, most of the countries of East and Central Europe, and other important trade partners. Covering most of its trade, these agreements attempted in part to establish a massive intergovernmental barter network. And along with some other interventions, they allowed the state enterprises to continue to receive energy products at prices well below the world market. But an erratic regulatory environ-ment for foreign exchange markets limited convertibility and aggravated payments difficulties.
The policies were highly unsuccessful. The inflation rate in 1993 shot up to over 10,000 percent. The cumulative output decline in 1992-94 exceeded 50 percent. Perhaps worse, the greatest decline (over 25 percent) was in 1994, when some reforming countries started to reverse the output decline. Total unemployment (including hidden unemployment) was close to 40 percent of the workforce in 1994.
Exports to the non-FSU world continued to decline through 1994. The intergovernmental agreements failed to stop the trade decline to the FSU, and the payments problems induced an even more precipitous drop in this trade. Cumulative capital flight for 1991-93 was about $8 to $10 billion, compared with exports to the hard currency areas of about $21 billion. Isolation from world market prices prevented enterprise adjustment to areas of comparative advantage and preserved inefficient enterprises.
Given the difficulties of exporting and efficient import substitution, large trade deficits opened. Favoritism to state enterprises choked private sector development. Public expenditure as a share of GDP is among the highest in the world, and the private contribution to GDP is among the lowest. Even when measured against the government's own stated objective of reducing adjustment costs during the transition, the policies failed-since output declined at least as fast as elsewhere in the FSU, and all the adjustment remained to be done.
Why were such poor policies chosen? Policymakers were avowedly searching for a middle path appropriate to Ukraine. Capitalism was too harsh, and the command economy a demonstrated failure. Workers' jobs were at stake.
Consider the trade regime. Intervention in the trade regime creates a wedge between world prices and domestic prices, and that allows rentseeking. The Ukrainian way induced lobbying by those who wished to export and by those who wished to obtain intermediate inputs at below world market prices (Havrylyshyn 1994) . Export restraints were therefore extremely well suited to capturing rents.
Recognizing these problems, Ukraine began a reform program in the fall of 1994. This included macroeconomic stabilization, considerable price liberalization (with substantial price controls remaining), and termination of most of the obvious forms of export restraints. Inflation fell dramatically, but remains in triple digits. Exports nevertheless remain subject to a reference price system, which de facto prevents exports below minimum prices without permission. The export control system thus remains highly subject to rent-seeking, casting doubt on the reform effort.
Quantifying the link between reform, exports, and GDP For most developing countries, the strong link between export growth and output growth originates in policies that avoid major market distortions (such as trade distortions) and are thus conducive to higher productivity, faster export expansion, and greater economic growth.
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And so it is with economies in transition. FSU countries that have reformed the fastest have also been the first to arrest their output decline. And they have, by and large, shown the fastest growth of exports to the rest of the world-and away from FSU markets. Cross-country regression analysis confirms these patterns (table 5) .
The average annual rate of change of exports to the rest of the world can be a proxy for trade liberalization. Since export restraints have been the dominant trade restraint in the NIS, their removal is virtually equivalent to trade liberalization-and should be reflected in export growth.
More generally, the ability to reorient trade tends to reflect a broad range of reforms, not just trade reforms. Countries that have liberalized their trade regimes have also tended to free domestic prices from controls and implement credible macroeconomic stabilization policies (see Kaminski, Wang, and Winters 1996 for a similar view).
10 There are exceptions. Uzbekistan reoriented its chief export, cotton, away from the FSLI without initiating major trade liberalization or stabilization until 1995.
We find that a one percentage point increase in the average rate of exports to the rest of the world during 1992-94 would be expected to increase the average rate of growth of GDP by 0.23 percentage points over the same period. De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb (1995) found a similar result when examining broader measures of liberalization-stabilization, as well as countries in Eastern and Central Europe. They explain that for policymakers caught in the deteriorating environment of a disintegrating economic system, nonreformers initially succeed in delaying the decline in output. But their output then contracts at an accelerating rate, so that after three years their position has deteriorated strongly compared to that of the reformers.
In addition, trade reform tends to be associated with macroeconomic stabilization. Bruno and Easterly (1995) show that very high rates of inflation are contractionary-both in a broad sample of countries and in the transition economies-because with hyperinflation the basis for economic decisionmaking in a market economy is lost.
Why would reform be expansionary? In trade, the removal of export restraints allows enterprises-hard pressed by the loss of markets in the contracting markets of the FSU-to sell their output for hard currencies. With the foreign exchange thus earned, the economy can purchase needed inputs in a variety of industries, preventing the further cumulative collapse of output. Given that it was not unusual to find the export tax equivalent of export quotas on raw materials at more than 200 or 300 percent, the costs of these policies were enormous. NIS is new independent states; ROW is rest of the world. Ntote: Here we estimate v = ax + b + e, where x is the average annual rate of change in exports to the rest of the world (column 3), y is the average annual rate of growth in GDP (column 1), and e is the error term. (Since exports to the rest of the world were no more than about 5 percent of GDP in all FSLI countries (see Tarr 1994, The principal shortcomings in the trade policies of the new independent states are for exports, not imports. Since the objectives of export restraints can be met more efficiently by taxes, remaining export licenses should be converted to export taxes, and the taxes eliminated over time. At the same time, countries need to exercise vigilance to ensureas the real exchange starts appreciating in response to effective stabilization-the implicit restraints on imports are not replaced with formal restraints that would impede future adjustment.
For payments, currency convertibility should be the goal for all countries, at least for current account transactions. Estonia and Latvia show that early currency convertibility is feasible. Even if currencies are not convertible, it is important to develop a network of correspondent accounts among the commercial banks of the FSU and foreign exchange markets. If the Russian ruble stabilizes, it will become a suitable currency for the denomination and settlement of trade. If it does not, other international currencies should be used instead of barter.
A clearing union could have served a useful purpose in facilitating trade among countries in transition with inconvertible currencies as late as last year. The Interstate Bank, agreed to by most CIS countries, was to be precisely such an arrangement. But the bank never became operational, essentially for political reasons. Russia did not want the institution because it had a trade surplus with practically all other CIS countries. And it was afraid that the clearing arrangement would be used to perpetuate its financing of the deficits of the other member countries of the bank. The others had a free-rider problem. No one country had a large enough incentive to push for the Interstate Bank, since the institution would work only if all the CIS countries participated and the benefits accrued to all (Gros 1994b) . Perhaps the time for a clearing arrangement has passed. The best course now is to push ahead with convertibility and take all possible steps to facilitate the use of correspondent accounts among commercial banks to facilitate payments.
More grandiose arrangements-such as payments unions-are counterproductive. They may create perverse incentives by providing balance of payments support to countries pursuing ineffective macroeconomic policies. Since countries receive credits based on deficits in their payments going through the payments union, a payments union could induce central banks to funnel payments through it that would choke off the budding development of correspondent accounts among commercial banks that is vital for convertibility and effective trading relations in the long run. More broadly, there are better policy instruments for stimulating trade and facilitating payments.
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Various efforts to introduce regional trade preferences could, under certain circumstances, have stimulated interstate trade and reduced adjustment costs during a transition phase without compromising the objective of wider integration of the countries in the international trading system. Unfortunately, the bulk of the so-called free-trade agreements among the FSU countries were free in name only. Most of them preserved export restraints on key products-restraints that continue to handicap interstate trade. This appears to be the case even in the proposed customs union among Russia, Belarus, and Kazakstan, as well as among Russia, Kazakstan, Uzbekistan, and the Kyrgyz Republic. Both would employ the external tariff of the Russian Federation.
Although a transitional preferential trade arrangement may have served a useful purpose, with external tariffs as high as Russia's today, such arrangements could divert substantial trade and be counterproductive. But the problems associated with these agreements would be lessened if Russia implements its announced tariff reductions.
Both trade and payments reform must be part of broader reforms aimed at macroeconomic stabilization and the introduction of market forces. Macroeconomic stability is essential for convertibility and the establishment of undistorted exchange rates, which in turn would reduce the incentives for export controls. Trade reform should be viewed as part of broader price and enterprise reform to introduce hard budget constraints and, where appropriate, transparent (and limited) support for enterprise adjustment.
The most important policy step countries can take to enhance international market access is to join the new World Trade Organization (WT7O)-the successor to GATT. Member countries would have some protection from arbitrary imposition of controls by other countries, including other former republics of the Soviet Union. All too often the new independent states have used trade as a weapon in their interstate political and economic relations. Joining the WTO requires that countries reform their trade regimes along the lines recommended here.
OECD countries can support these countries' integration into the international economy by ending their designations as non-market economies-with guidance from the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund that they have taken appropriate programs of stabilization and structural adjustment.
Countries that undertake the reforms recommended here can expect a revitalization of their trade. This has happened in Eastern Europe and is happening among the fastest reformers in the FSU-including the Baltics and, starting in 1995, Russia.
This does not mean that countries will soon reach the very high levels of trade recorded in 1990. Although international trade was severely controlled under central planning, the dollar value of their international trade for the FSU countries in 1990 was artificially inflated because of the very large overvaluation of the ruble with the dollar. Moreover, there is likely to be a substantial shift of trade toward the OECD countries, already under way. FSU countries traded too much with each other for reasons unrelated to economic efficiency. Better economic policies and a stronger institutional environment for trade could increase trade in the future, but a decline in intraregional trade relative to what existed under central planning. The outcome would be a better overall integration of these countries into the international economy.
7. Based on Konovalov (1994), Glaziev (1994), and Gros (1994) . 8. Based on Le Gall (1994) , Havrylyshyn (1994) , Kaufmann (1994) , and Bull (1994 11. For an elaboration of the reform strategy, see Michalopoulos and Tarr (1994b) . 12. For an elaboration of the advantages and disadvantages of payments and clearing unions, see the annex to Michalopoulos and Tarr (1994b) .
